Common Intention Under Section 34 IPC: Joint and Constructive Liability Explained with Landmark Cases
- Umang
- Jun 4
- 20 min read
Table of Contents
When four men stood outside a post office in Calcutta in 1924, one entered and fired shots at the postmaster, who died. Whether the man who stood outside, covering the exit, was guilty of murder was the question that reached the Privy Council in Barendra Kumar Ghosh v King Emperor AIR 1925 PC 1 — one of the foundational cases in Indian criminal law. The Privy Council's answer: he was. Even if it was not his hand that fired the fatal shot, his participation in the common enterprise made him as guilty as if he had fired it himself.
That principle — encapsulated in Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 — has governed the law of joint criminal liability in India ever since. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the same principle lives on as Section 3(5), reproduced without a word of substantive change. It remains, as Lord Sumner described it in Barendra Kumar Ghosh, a provision that recognises that criminal liability is not purely individual: where men act in concert towards a criminal end, each is responsible for what all do.
The Provision: Text and Position Under the BNS
Section 34 IPC reads: When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.
Under the BNS, this provision has been incorporated as Section 3(5) — one of the 'General Explanations' in Section 3, which consolidates the IPC's scattered general provisions into a single section organised in sub-sections. The BNS comparison table confirms that the IPC section is included as a sub-section in BNS sans heading with no other change. All judicial precedent built under Section 34 IPC therefore applies with equal force to Section 3(5) BNS.
Nature of Section 34: Rule of Evidence, Not Substantive Offence
The first thing the courts have insisted on establishing is what Section 34 is not. Section 34 is not a substantive offence and does not create an offence by itself. It is a rule of evidence that recognises the principle of constructive criminal liability (Suresh v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2001 SC 1344). It is not by itself an offence but creates a joint and constructive liability for the crime committed in furtherance of the common intention (Hare Krishna Singh v State of Bihar AIR 1988 SC 863).
The provision establishes that conviction of a person relying upon Section 34 is for the offence committed in furtherance of the common intention — the accused is convicted not of some separate offence of 'acting with common intention', but of the substantive offence — murder, robbery, or any other — as if he had committed it himself (Jaikrishnadas Manohardas Desai v State of Bombay AIR 1960 SC 889). Section 34 is the vehicle through which liability for that substantive offence is attributed to each participant.
This character as a rule of evidence rather than a substantive offence has a critical procedural implication: the absence of a specific mention of Section 34 in the framing of a charge does not vitiate the judgment, provided the accused is not thereby prejudiced (Narinder Singh v State of Punjab AIR 2000 SC 2212).
The Two Indispensable Postulates
The courts have repeatedly held that two conditions are indispensable to attract Section 34 (Suresh v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2001 SC 1344; Hemchandra Jha v State of Bihar (2008) 11 SCC 303; Surinder Singh v State of Punjab (2006) 13 SCC 533):
Postulate One: Criminal Act Done by More Than One Person
The criminal act consisting of a series of acts must have been done not by one person alone, but by more than one person. Each individual act, done cumulatively, must result in the commission of the criminal offence. Even doing of separate, similar, or diverse acts by several persons, so long as they are done in furtherance of a common intention, renders each of them liable for the result of them all, as if he had done them himself — including covert acts and even illegal omissions (Gopi Nath @ Jhallar v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2001 SC 2493). The 'act' need not be very substantial or an overt act — it must merely have some nexus with the offence (Hari Ram v State of Uttar Pradesh (2004) 8 SCC 146).
Postulate Two: The Act Must Be in Furtherance of the Common Intention
Every individual act, cumulatively resulting in the commission of the criminal offence, must have been done in furtherance of the common intention of all such persons. Both postulates are the acts which must be attributed and proved as actions of the accused; the final conviction for the resulting offence is the consequence (Nand Kishore v State of Madhya Pradesh (2011) 12 SCC 120). When both are proved, each is liable for the criminal act as if it were done by him alone.
What 'Common Intention' Means: The Judicial Definition
The expression 'common intention' is nowhere defined in the IPC or the BNS. Its content has been shaped entirely by judicial interpretation, and the courts have been precise.
Simultaneous Consensus of Mind
The dominant feature of common intention is a simultaneous consensus of the minds of persons participating in a criminal action to bring about a particular result (Virendra Singh v State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 8 SCC 407). It may also be described as the volition of the mind immediately preceding the act and implies resolution of the mind (Mohd Khalid v State of West Bengal (2002) 7 SCC 334). The essence of the provision is this simultaneous consensus — it is not the similarity of intentions entertained independently, but a shared intention that has been communicated between the participants and accepted by all.
Prior Concert and Pre-Arranged Plan
Common intention must be anterior in time to the commission of the crime, showing a pre-arranged plan and prior concert, which is inferable from the acts, conduct, or other relevant circumstances of the case (Ram Tahal v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1972 SC 254). Common intention denotes action in concert and necessarily postulates a pre-arranged plan or prior meeting of minds and an element of participation in action (Dharam Pal v State of Haryana AIR 1978 SC 1492). In other words, common intention is a premeditated meeting of the mind (Abani K Debnath v State of Tripura AIR 2006 SC 18).
There need not be a long interval of time between the formation of the common intention and the doing of the act (Rishideo Pande v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1955 SC 331). Prior concert and a pre-arranged plan require that there must have been a prior meeting of minds (Pandurang v State of Hyderabad AIR 1955 SC 216). The prior concert or meeting of minds may be determined from the conduct of the offenders and circumstances unfolding during the course of action and from declarations made by them just before mounting the attack (Ramashish Yadav v State of Bihar (1999) 8 SCC 555).
Common Intention Can Develop on the Spot
This is one of the most important — and most litigated — aspects of Section 34. Common intention does not have to be pre-formed long in advance. The essence of the provision is simultaneous consensus of the minds of persons, and that consensus may be developed on the spot (Lallan Rai v State of Bihar AIR 2003 SC 333; Surendra Chauban v State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2000 SC 1436). Common intention supposes prior concert, which may be formed previously or in the course of occurrence and on the spur of the moment. The crucial test is that such plan must precede the act constituting the offence (Suresh v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2001 SC 1344).
Even where there is no evidence of a prior meeting of minds, where the sequence of events which unfold during the course of occurrence clearly indicates the predetermined minds of the accused persons not to cause injuries alone but to kill the deceased, their conviction is proper (Rami Singh v State of Bihar (2001) 9 SCC 528).
Each Accused Must Share and Know the Intention of the Others
The intention of each one of the group must be known to, and shared by, the rest of them (Hanuman Prasad v State of Rajasthan (2009) 1 SCC 507). To constitute common intention, it is necessary that the intention of each of the accused be known to the rest and shared by them all (Ankeri v State of Rajasthan AIR 1994 SC 842). An intention kept private, unknown to the others, is not a common intention — it is an individual intention that happens to coexist with others at the scene.
Common Intention Distinguished from Same or Similar Intention
The line between common intention and the same or similar intention accidentally held by several persons simultaneously is one of the most important distinctions in the law, and if overlooked will result in a miscarriage of justice (Pandurang v State of Hyderabad AIR 1955 SC 216).
Where there is no prior meeting of minds to form a pre-arranged plan, and each of several persons who simultaneously attack another has the same intention but that intention has not been communicated and shared between them, they do not share a common intention. They have the same intention — but it is held in parallel silos, not in common. Section 34 does not apply to such a case; each person is liable only for his own acts.
Common intention developed at the spur of the moment is also different from a similar intention actuating a number of persons at the same time. The distinction is real and substantial even when the line is slim (Pandurang v State of Hyderabad AIR 1955 SC 216). For constituting common intention, it is necessary that the intention of each one of several persons be known to each other — communication and sharing are indispensable.
Common Intention Distinguished from Common Object
Section 34 and Section 149 IPC (Section 190 BNS — no change) both deal with vicarious or constructive liability for crimes committed by groups, but the two are fundamentally different concepts.
Common intention denotes action in concert and necessarily postulates a pre-arranged plan implying a prior meeting of minds. Common object, by contrast, does not necessarily require proof of a prior meeting of minds or prior concert (Chittarmal v State of Rajasthan AIR 2003 SC 796). Under common intention, the emphasis is on physical presence and promotion or facilitation of the crime, or an element of participation in action (Ram Tahal v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1972 SC 254). Under common object, merely being a member of an unlawful assembly possessing the relevant common object may be sufficient (Jaswant Singh v State of Haryana AIR 2000 SC 1833).
The expression 'common intention' is undefined and thereby has unlimited operation, while the phrase 'common object' cannot go beyond the five objects enumerated in Section 141 IPC (Dani Singh & Ors v State of Bihar (2004) Cr LJ 3328 (SC)). Section 34 only establishes a rule of evidence; Section 149 creates a specific offence (Nanak Chand v State of Punjab AIR 1955 SC 274). While both provisions have substantial differences, they may in some cases overlap — that question must be determined on the facts of each case (Chittarmal v State of Rajasthan AIR 2003 SC 796).
'In Furtherance' of Common Intention: The Causative Link
The phrase 'in furtherance' is the operative link between the common intention and the act. The dictionary meaning of 'furtherance' is 'advancement or promotion'. The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as 'action of helping forward'. It indicates some kind of aid or assistance producing an effect in future, and any act may be regarded as done in furtherance of the ultimate felony if it is a step intentionally taken for the purpose of effecting that felony (Parasa Raja Manikyala Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2004 SC 132).
The criminal act mentioned in Section 34 is the result of the concerted action of more than one person. Where the result was reached in furtherance of the common intention, each person is liable for the result as if he had done it himself (Shankarlal Kacharabhai v State of Gujarat AIR 1965 SC 1260). It is not necessary that the act done in furtherance of the common intention be the very act intended by the accused.
It may be a preliminary act necessary before achieving the common intention, or an act necessary while achieving it (Bashir v State AIR 1953 All 668). And the act need not be identical for all participants — acts may be different in character but must be actuated by one and the same common intention (Hari Ram v State of Uttar Pradesh (2004) 8 SCC 146).
Participation: The Physical Element Required
Physical Presence for Violent Offences
The leading attribute of Section 34 is 'participation in action' (Jaikrishnadas Manohardas Desai v State of Bombay AIR 1960 SC 889). In cases involving physical violence, for the provision to apply, the person who instigates or aids the commission of the crime must be physically present at the actual commission of the crime for the purpose of facilitating or promoting the offence, the commission of which is the aim of the joint criminal venture (Ramaswami Ayyangar v State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1976 SC 2027). Such presence of those who in one way or another facilitate the execution of the common design is itself tantamount to actual participation in the criminal act (Surendra Chauhan v State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2000 SC 1436).
Merely distancing oneself from the scene of crime may not absolve a person (Lallan Rai v State of Bihar (2003) 1 SCC 268). An accused who, according to a pre-arranged plan, persuaded the deceased to come out of the house when he was fatally attacked, would be assumed to have shared the common intention with the main assailant even though he may not have participated in the actual attack (Boota Singh v State of Punjab (1997) SCC (Cr) 904).
Covert Acts and Omissions Can Constitute Participation
Section 34 applies even where no overt act is attributed to the individual accused, provided the common intention is proved — it essentially involves vicarious liability in such cases (Jai Bhagwan & Ors v State of Haryana AIR 1999 SC 1083; Bishna @ Bhiswadeb Mahato v State of West Bengal AIR 2006 SC 302). A covert act proved to have been done by a co-accused in furtherance of the common intention, and in certain circumstances even an illegal omission to do a certain act, may amount to an act sufficient to fasten liability on the person (Suresh v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2001 SC 1344).
Where common intention is proved but no overt act is attributed to the individual accused, the provision will be attracted as it essentially involves vicarious liability. The court's mind regarding the sharing of a common intention gets satisfied when an overt act is established qua each of the accused; in other cases, the proved facts may themselves speak of the sharing of common intention — res ipsa loquitur (Krishnan v State of Kerala (1996) 10 SCC 508).
Mere Presence Is Not Enough
Mere presence of the accused may not lead to the inference of their joint participation in the criminal act and common intention on their part with the convicted accused (Vithal Tukaram More v State of Maharashtra AIR 2002 SC 2715). Fortuitous presence of an accused, even when armed, in the absence of evidence to establish a pre-arranged plan to kill the deceased, only shows probability of the existence of a common intention but not a certainty sufficient to convict under Section 34 (Gajjan Singh v State of Punjab AIR 1976 SC 2069).
Where participation of the accused in the crime is proved but common intention is absent, the provision will not be invoked (Surendra Chauban v State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2000 SC 1436). Inaction on the part of co-accused — who were likely in the house when the incident occurred — in not saving the deceased from assault by the convicted accused may be morally reprehensible, but would not make them criminally liable (Vithal Tukaram More v State of Maharashtra AIR 2002 SC 2715).
Proving Common Intention: Direct and Circumstantial Evidence
Inference from Acts, Conduct, and Circumstances
Direct proof for common intention will generally be difficult to obtain (State of Uttar Pradesh v Iftikhar Khan AIR 1973 SC 863). It is not necessary to adduce direct evidence of common intention, which may be inferred from surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the parties (Badruddin v State of Uttar Pradesh (1998) 7 SCC 300).
Common intention is a state of mind of an accused which may be inferred objectively from his conduct displayed in the course of the commission of the crime as also prior and subsequent attendant circumstances (Harjit Singh v State of Punjab (2002) 6 SCC 739). The subjective element in common intention must be proved by an objective test — it is only then that one accused may be made vicariously liable for the acts and deeds of another co-accused.
The common intention may be inferred from: the nature of weapons used (Dukhmochan Pandey v State of Bihar AIR 1998 SC 40); the manner of injuries inflicted (Yallappa v State of Karnataka (1994) 1 SCC 730); the conduct of accused prior, during, and subsequent to the incident (Hari Om v State of Uttar Pradesh (1993) Supp 2 SCC 1); the manner in which the accused arrived at the scene and mounted the attack; the determination and concert with which the attack was made; and any other incriminating facts established by evidence (Ramashish Yadav v State of Bihar AIR 1999 SC 3830).
For drawing an inference of common intention, the evidence and circumstances of the case must establish, without any room for doubt, that a meeting of minds and a fusion of ideas had taken place amongst the different accused, and in prosecution of it the overt acts of the accused flowed out (Dukhmochan Pandey v State of Bihar AIR 1998 SC 40). The question of common intention is a matter of fact in each case and has to be proved as a necessary inference from the facts and circumstances of the case (Mohan Singh v State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 174).
The Standard of Proof Required
The prosecution must establish beyond any shadow of doubt and must prove facts to justify an inference that all the participants in the act had shared a common intention to commit the criminal act which was finally committed by one of them (Bhaba Nanda Sarma v State of Assam AIR 1977 SC 2252).
The proof, direct or circumstantial, of prior concert must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation on any other reasonable hypothesis (Rotash v State of Rajasthan (2007) Cr LJ 758 (SC)). Unless common intention is established as a matter of necessary inference from the proved circumstances, the accused persons will be liable only for their individual acts (Brijlala Pd Sinha v State of Bihar AIR 1998 SC 2443).
Joint Liability and Murder: The Critical Cases
Barendra Kumar Ghosh v King Emperor: The Foundation
Barendra Kumar Ghosh v King Emperor AIR 1925 PC 1 is the foundational authority. Several persons surrounded a sub-postmaster, one shooting and killing him while the others stood guard outside. The accused argued he fired no shot and caused no death. The Privy Council held him guilty of murder — participation in the common criminal enterprise with common intention made each member responsible for all acts done in furtherance of it. The provision embodies the principle that even those who stand outside, keeping watch, share the liability for what is done inside, provided they acted in furtherance of the common intention.
Pandurang v State of Hyderabad: Prior Meeting of Minds
Pandurang v State of Hyderabad AIR 1955 SC 216 is among the most important Supreme Court pronouncements on Section 34. The court held that common intention implies a pre-arranged plan and a prior meeting of minds, though the interval between formation and execution need not be long. The court also drew the crucial distinction between common intention and the same or similar intention held independently by several persons: where men have a hastily formed or rudely conceived plan, each may have the same intention without sharing a common intention. That distinction, the court stated, was real and substantial, and if overlooked would result in miscarriage of justice.
Anda v State of Rajasthan: Common Intention and Knowledge of Fatal Injuries
In Anda v State of Rajasthan AIR 1966 SC 148, the Supreme Court held that in cases involving murder, courts must look for a common intention — some prior concert — and must then examine whether the accused possessed the knowledge that the injuries they were intending to cause were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
If the circumstances are established and death results from those intended injuries, which are also sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to result in death, each of the accused is guilty of murder. When the medical evidence establishes the injuries caused by the accused were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and common intention is established, the question of who dealt the fatal blow is wholly immaterial (State of Maharashtra v Kalu Shivram Jagtap AIR 1980 SC 879).
Shankarlal Kacharabhai v State of Gujarat: The Wrong Victim
Shankarlal Kacharabhai v State of Gujarat AIR 1965 SC 1260 addressed the mistaken identity scenario. The accused, in furtherance of their common intention, may commit a criminal act injuring an unconnected or innocent person under a mistaken identity. The question is not whether the committing of a mistake was part of the common intention, but whether the criminal act was done in furtherance of the common intention, even though someone else was affected. Section 34 applies with full force.
Effect of Acquittal of Co-Accused
Where several persons are alleged to have committed an offence in furtherance of a common intention and all except one are acquitted, the conviction of the remaining accused cannot be sustained unless there is evidence that there were other unnamed participants in the criminal enterprise (Krishna Govind Patil v State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 1413).
However, the acquittal of some co-accused will not prevent the court from considering the guilt of others (Pipal Singh v State of Punjab (2001) 2 SCC 292). An appellate court may, on a reappraisal of the evidence, find that some accused were wrongly acquitted, for the limited purpose of ascertaining the constructive liability of the convicted person (Brathi v State of Punjab AIR 1991 SC 318).
Where failure of the prosecution to establish that the acquitted co-accused were with the main accused and participated in the offence results in only one accused remaining, that person is liable only for the injury he inflicted. In light of the nature of the weapon, the part of the body struck, and the size of the injury, his liability must be assessed individually, and he may not be convicted of murder — he may instead face conviction for a lesser offence (Ramchandra Obdar v State of Bihar AIR 1999 SC 998).
Persons May Be Guilty of Different Offences Under the Same Act
One of the most practically significant aspects of the co-operation provisions in the IPC is that where several persons are engaged or concerned in the commission of a criminal act, they may be guilty of different offences by means of that act (Bhaba Nanda Sarma v State of Assam AIR 1977 SC 2252). This is explicitly stated in Section 38 IPC, which is reproduced as Section 3(9) BNS without change.
In practice, this means that where two accused act together but share a common intention only to cause grievous injuries (not to kill), and one of them uses a weapon in a manner that causes death, the one who struck the fatal blow may be convicted of murder while the other faces a conviction for a lesser offence under Section 304 IPC — because the lesser accused shared the common intention to cause grievous injury, not to cause death (State of Uttar Pradesh v Ram Kishun AIR 1976 SC 2016).
Liability is thus calibrated according to the nature of each individual's common intention and the role played. The courts must take into consideration all attendant circumstances while considering the degree of involvement and culpability for the offence committed (Ramesh Kumar v State of Bihar AIR 1993 SC 2317).
Framing of Charges and Common Intention
The absence of a specific mention of Section 34 in the framing of a charge does not vitiate the judgment, provided no prejudice is caused to the accused (Narinder Singh v State of Punjab AIR 2000 SC 2212). Where the ingredients of the offence under Section 34 are present, their non-mention in the charge does not vitiate the judgment. The accused need not be separately charged with 'common intention' — Section 34 is applied in the judgment to the substantive offence charged, and the conviction is for that substantive offence.
The BNS Position: Section 3(5) and What Has Changed
As confirmed by the BNS comparison table, the IPC's Section 34 has been reproduced as Section 3(5) BNS as a sub-section within Section 3 (General Explanations), without any change to its content. The heading has been dropped in the BNS's reformatted structure, but the operative text is identical.
The companion provisions — Section 35 IPC (criminal act by reason of criminal knowledge or intention done jointly — Section 3(6) BNS), Section 36 IPC (effect caused partly by act and partly by omission — Section 3(7) BNS), Section 37 IPC (co-operation by doing one of several acts constituting an offence — Section 3(8) BNS), and Section 38 IPC (persons concerned in criminal act may be guilty of different offences — Section 3(9) BNS) — are all incorporated in the BNS identically, without any substantive change.
The BNS's renaming and renumbering convention means practitioners must search for these provisions in Section 3, not in the standalone sections of the IPC. But the law itself is precisely the same. Every landmark case decided under Section 34 IPC — from Barendra Kumar Ghosh to Pandurang, from Anda to Shankarlal Kacharabhai — remains authoritative under the BNS.
The new offences introduced by the BNS — organised crime (Section 111), petty organised crime (Section 112), and terrorist act (Section 113) — are themselves offences that by their nature involve group action and shared criminal enterprise. While these sections carry their own definitional structures, the Section 3(5) BNS framework for joint liability remains available to attribute liability where a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of a common intention in the course of committing these offences.
Conclusion
Section 34 IPC — now Section 3(5) BNS — is one of the most frequently invoked and most litigated provisions in the Indian criminal courts. Its principle is deceptively simple: where men act together in furtherance of a shared criminal purpose, each is as guilty as if he had done everything himself. Its application, however, requires the prosecution to establish — as a matter of necessary inference, incompatible with innocence — that a meeting of minds and fusion of ideas took place, and that each accused participated in furtherance of that shared design.
The courts have drawn clear lines: common intention is not the same as similar intention; it requires prior concert and a shared plan that precedes the act, even if formed on the spur of the moment; it requires physical participation for crimes of violence; and it cannot be established merely from the fact of presence at the scene. Where those requirements are met, the law holds each participant equally responsible — for the man who stands guard outside a post office is as responsible for the death inside as the one who fired.
That principle, articulated by the Privy Council in 1925 and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court across a century of decisions, survives intact under the BNS. The section number has changed; the doctrine has not.
Frequently Asked Questions
Q: Is Section 34 IPC / Section 3(5) BNS a substantive offence?
No. Section 34 is not a substantive offence and does not create an offence by itself. It is a rule of evidence that establishes the principle of constructive criminal liability. When applied, it makes each participant in a criminal act committed in furtherance of the common intention of all liable for that act as if he had done it himself. The conviction is for the substantive offence — murder, robbery, hurt — not for 'acting with common intention'.
Q: Can a person be convicted under Section 34 IPC even if no overt act is attributed to him?
Yes, in certain circumstances. Where common intention is clearly established and the person's participation in the common criminal enterprise is proved — through covert acts, facilitation, or in certain cases even illegal omissions — the provision applies even without a specific overt act. However, where no act of any kind is done by a person, even if he has common intention with the others, the provision will not be invoked for convicting that person.
Q: What is the difference between common intention under Section 34 and common object under Section 149 IPC?
Common intention under Section 34 requires a pre-arranged plan and a prior meeting of minds — the intention of each must be known to and shared by the rest. Common object under Section 149 does not require proof of a prior meeting of minds; membership of an unlawful assembly with the relevant common object may be sufficient. Section 34 is a rule of evidence; Section 149 creates a specific offence. They may overlap but are conceptually distinct.
Q: What happens when all co-accused except one are acquitted?
If all except one are acquitted and there is no evidence that unnamed others participated, the conviction of the remaining accused under Section 34 cannot ordinarily be sustained. However, an appellate court may, on reappraisal, find that some accused were wrongly acquitted, for the limited purpose of ascertaining the constructive liability of the convicted person. Where the single remaining accused is convicted, his liability must then be assessed individually, based on his own acts and the specific nature of his common intention.
Q: Does Section 34 apply under the BNS 2023?
Yes. Section 34 IPC is reproduced without any substantive change as Section 3(5) BNS. The BNS comparison table confirms it is included as a sub-section in BNS without any alteration to its content. All judicial precedent under Section 34 IPC applies with equal force to Section 3(5) BNS.
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