'Complaint' Under Section 2(d) CrPC: Why a Police Report Is Not a Complaint and the Crucial Procedural Difference

Table of Contents

• Two Routes to the Magistrate's Court — and Why They Matter

• Section 2(d) CrPC: The Statutory Definition of Complaint

• Section 2(r) CrPC: The Definition of Police Report and Why Only Section 173(2) Qualifies

• The Explanation to Section 2(d): When a Police Report Is Deemed a Complaint

• The Three Routes of Cognizance Under Section 190(1)

• Seven Crucial Procedural Differences Between Complaint Cases and Police-Report Cases

• Judicial Interpretation: Key Authorities on the Complaint–Police Report Divide

• BNSS 2023: What Has Changed and What Has Not

• Common Misconceptions

• Conclusion

• Frequently Asked Questions

A victim of cheating files a written allegation with the Magistrate's Court narrating the fraud in precise detail. An officer in charge of a police station, having completed investigation into the same transaction, submits a charge-sheet to the same Magistrate. Both documents land on the Magistrate's desk. Both allege the commission of an offence.

But the legal terrain they open is entirely different — the examination procedure they trigger, the machinery through which the accused is summoned, the remedies available to the aggrieved party when the proceeding stalls, and the standard applied at every stage, are governed by two distinct tracks. That divide originates in Section 2(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which defines complaint with one crucial exclusion: "does not include a police report."

Section 2(d) CrPC: The Statutory Definition of Complaint

Section 2(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 defines a complaint as any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under the Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence — but does not include a police report.

The definition is deliberately broad. The Code gives it a wide meaning since it includes even an oral allegation — no particular form is prescribed. There must, however, be an allegation which prima facie discloses the commission of an offence, with sufficient facts for the Magistrate to take action — as the Supreme Court laid down in Bhimappa v. Laxman (AIR 1970 SC 1153 (1156) : (1970) 1 SCC 665 : 1970 CrLJ 1132).

Ingredient 1: An Oral or Written Allegation

The allegation need not be in any particular form (Bhimappa v. Laxman). A letter or telegram addressed to the Magistrate may constitute a complaint if it fulfils the other requirements of the definition (Sadiee v. Gaya Prasad, AIR 1941 Pat 144). What is required is that there must be some factual allegation — a statement of the acts alleged to constitute an offence.

The omission to mention the specific section of law under which the offence is punishable, or the mention of a wrong section, does not affect the validity of the complaint, provided the facts, if proved, would warrant conviction (Shyam Lal v. State, AIR 1938 All 76). A petition that discloses no offence at all, or whose allegations even if true could not amount to an offence, is not a complaint and is liable to be dismissed under Section 203 CrPC upon bare perusal (Debendra v. State of W.B., AIR 1972 SC 1607).

Ingredient 2: Made to a Magistrate

The allegation must be made to a Magistrate — not to the police, not to a Panchayat, not to any other authority (Tej Singh v. State, AIR 1965 All 508 (510)). A report to the police or to some other authority cannot be treated as a complaint within the meaning of Section 2(d). The significance of this ingredient is not merely formal: the Magistrate to whom the complaint is made is the authority whose judicial action the complaint is intended to set in motion.

It is not necessary that the name of the accused be mentioned (Dedar v. Shyamapada, 41 Cal 1013) — a complaint may be against a person unknown (Sevantilal v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1969 Guj 14). The Code does not require the complainant to name the accused, provided the facts are sufficiently stated.

Ingredient 3: With a View to the Magistrate Taking Action Under the Code

The critical animus of a complaint is that it is made with a view to the Magistrate taking criminal action under the Code — not merely administrative action (Subodh v. Jamser, AIR 1949 Cal 55). A petition or representation to a Magistrate seeking purely administrative intervention is not a complaint. Equally, allegations made to a Magistrate with a prayer to proceed under Section 107 (security proceedings for breach of peace), Section 133 (removal of public nuisance), Section 145 (dispute as to possession of land), or Section 125 (maintenance) do not constitute complaints under Section 2(d), because these are not criminal actions within the purpose of the definition. The complaint must be aimed at setting the criminal law in motion, culminating in the prosecution and trial of the accused.

Ingredient 4: Alleging Commission of an Offence by Some Person

There must be an allegation that some person has committed an offence — a past act or omission constituting a criminal offence under the law. Nothing is a complaint which, if proved, would not lead to a conviction. The Magistrate is entitled to read the complaint and dismiss it at threshold if it discloses no offence.

What Is Excluded: Police Report

Section 2(d) expressly excludes a police report from the definition of complaint. This exclusion is the pivot of the entire divide. Under the old Code, there was no such definition of a police report, and a sharp judicial controversy arose as to whether any report submitted by a police officer to a Magistrate — whether under Section 157, Section 170, or Section 173 — would qualify as a police report for the purposes of taking cognizance. The 1973 Code resolved this controversy definitively by inserting a separate definition of police report in Section 2(r).

Section 2(r) CrPC: The Definition of Police Report and Why Only Section 173(2) Qualifies

Section 2(r) CrPC defines police report as a report forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under sub-section (2) of Section 173. This definition is narrow and specific. It refers exclusively to the final report submitted by the officer in charge of the police station upon completion of the investigation.

A police officer may report to the Magistrate at several stages during investigation:

• A preliminary report under Section 157, made at the time of taking up the investigation

• A report under Section 170, forwarding the accused in custody when sufficient evidence appears during investigation

• A final report under Section 173(2), on completion of the investigation — the charge-sheet

Of these, only the final report under Section 173(2) is a police report for the purposes of Section 2(r) and, consequently, for Section 190(1)(b). The Magistrate has no jurisdiction to treat a Section 157 or Section 170 report as a police report and take cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) — it can only be treated as a complaint under Section 190(1)(a). The Magistrate has no jurisdiction either to treat such a report as "information" under Section 190(1)(c), since the expression "information" also excludes information received from a police officer (Suraj Mani v. State of Orissa, (1980) CrLJ 363).

The Four Conditions for a Valid Police Report

Read with Section 173(2), a police report in order to come within the definition in Section 2(r) must satisfy four conditions:

1. It must be a final report submitted on completion of the investigation.

2. It must be submitted by the officer in charge of the police station.

3. It must be submitted to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report.

4. The report must be submitted in the form prescribed by the State Government and must contain all the particulars specified in Section 173(2).

   
   

Once these four conditions are satisfied, the report does not lose its character as a police report merely because the documents mentioned in Section 173(5) — statements of witnesses, copies of documents — have not been submitted simultaneously. That sub-section lays down an independent obligation, as confirmed in State of H.P. v. Guddu ((1983) CrLJ 402).

The Old Controversy and How the New Code Resolved It

Under the old Code, some courts held that a Magistrate could take cognizance under what corresponded to Section 190(1)(b) on any report submitted by a police officer, whether under Section 157, Section 170, or Section 173 (Lal Khan v. Emp., AIR 1945 Lah 43). This was the vice that the 1973 Code corrected by inserting the definitions in Sections 2(r) and 2(d) together. As the source commentary confirms, the new Code made it clear that the expression "police report" throughout the Code would refer to the final report under Section 173(2) in cognizable cases, and in non-cognizable cases where investigation was ordered by a Magistrate under Section 155(2).

The Explanation to Section 2(d): When a Police Report Is Deemed a Complaint

The Explanation to Section 2(d) creates a legal fiction: it deems certain police reports to be complaints, making the police officer who submits them the complainant for the purposes of the Code. This fiction operates in the following categories:

Category 1: Unauthorised Investigation of a Non-Cognizable Offence

Where a police officer investigates a non-cognizable offence without the order of a competent Magistrate as required by Section 155(2), the report submitted by that officer is not a police report under Section 2(r) — it is deemed a complaint under the Explanation to Section 2(d). The police officer himself is deemed the complainant (Mailsauri v. State, (1994) CrLJ 2238).

The Magistrate who receives such a report cannot take cognizance under Section 190(1)(b); he must treat it as a complaint under Section 190(1)(a) and apply the complaint procedure — including examination of the complainant under Section 200.

The principle is confirmed with equal force: when a police officer investigated a non-cognizable offence without the Magistrate's order and submitted a charge-sheet, the Magistrate cannot take cognizance and frame a charge — the order framing the charge is liable to be quashed. If the entire investigation without the Magistrate's order cannot be validated retrospectively, neither can the report founded on it serve as a police report.

Category 2: Investigation of Cognizable Offence Revealing Non-Cognizable Offence

Where a police officer starts investigation into a cognizable offence but on investigation finds that the evidence discloses the commission of a non-cognizable offence, the report he submits in such a case shall be deemed to be a complaint (Antulay v. Nayak, AIR 1984 SC 718, confirmed in Biswanath v. State, (1978) CrLJ 318). The Explanation to Section 2(d) covers precisely those cases where the police initially investigate a cognizable case but the offence turns out to be non-cognizable — as settled in Keshav Lal Thakur v. State of Bihar ((1996) 11 SCC 557).

Category 3: Report by a Public Servant Not Empowered to File a Charge-Sheet Under Section 173

Where a report is made by a public servant — such as an Excise Officer under Section 21(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (Badaku v. State of Mysore, AIR 1966 SC 1746), or under Section 14(3) of the Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952 (C.H.O. Storage Co. v. Prafulla, AIR 1967 Bom 126) — which merely authorises inquiry but does not empower the officer to submit a charge-sheet under Section 173 of the Code, such a report must be treated as a complaint under Section 190(1)(a) and not as a police report.

The counter-principle applies equally: if a special law expressly deems a regulatory officer to be the officer in charge of a police station "for the purposes of Section 156 of the CrPC" — as the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1915 did — such officer has the power to submit a charge-sheet under Section 173(2), and the Magistrate's cognizance would be under Section 190(1)(b) as a police report (Raja Ram v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 828).

The Three Routes of Cognizance Under Section 190(1)

Section 190(1) CrPC provides three routes through which a Magistrate may take cognizance of an offence:

Section 190(1)(a): Complaint Route

Cognizance upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute an offence. This is the complaint track — and it activates the entire machinery of Sections 200, 202, and 203. The Magistrate who takes cognizance under this clause must examine the complainant and witnesses under Section 200 unless the complaint is made in writing by a public servant acting in an official capacity, or if the case is transferred to another Magistrate under Section 192.

Section 190(1)(b): Police Report Route

Cognizance upon a police report — that is, a Section 173(2) final report. Cognizance taken under this route does not require the Magistrate to examine the complainant under Section 200. The Magistrate applies his mind to the charge-sheet, the documents forwarded under Section 173(5), and considers under Sections 239 and 240 (in a warrant-case) or Section 251 (in a summons-case) whether to proceed. The source material confirms: when the Magistrate takes cognizance in pursuance of a police report under Section 173, he is not bound to follow the procedure under Sections 200 and 202 (Nirmaljit Singh Hooz v. State of W.B., AIR 1972 SC 2639).

Section 190(1)(c): Suo Motu Route

Cognizance upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon the Magistrate's own knowledge. This route also excludes police officers as sources — underscoring the legislative design that police officers can only ground Magistrate cognizance through the Section 173(2) police report route, not through any other channel.

Seven Crucial Procedural Differences Between Complaint Cases and Police-Report Cases

The significance of the Section 2(d) exclusion is felt most sharply in seven areas where the procedure applicable to complaint cases departs from the procedure in police-report cases:

1. Examination of Complainant: Section 200

Section 200 CrPC is mandatory in complaint cases: a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and reduce the substance of such examination to writing. The object is to ascertain whether there is a prima facie case and to prevent the issue of process on a complaint that is false, vexatious, or intended only to harass the accused (Nirmaljit Singh Hooz v. State of W.B.).

In police-report cases, there is no Section 200 examination. The Magistrate acts upon the police report and the materials furnished under Section 173(5). Even where the Magistrate takes cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) disagreeing with the police conclusion in the final report, he is not required to examine any complainant under Section 200 (Nirmaljit Singh Hooz).

Two exceptions relieve the Magistrate of the Section 200 obligation even in complaint cases: where the complaint is in writing and is made by a public servant acting in the discharge of official duties; or where the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under Section 192.

2. Magistrate's Inquiry and Investigation: Section 202

After examining the complainant under Section 200, the Magistrate may — under Section 202 CrPC — postpone the issue of process and either inquire into the case himself, or direct investigation by a police officer, or by any other person. The objects of this inquiry are to prevent a person named as accused from being called to face a frivolous complaint, to find out what material there is to support the allegations, and to determine whether there is a prima facie case for issuing process (Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose, AIR 1963 SC 1430).

In cases exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the Magistrate must direct the complainant to produce all witnesses and examine them at the Section 202 inquiry — he cannot direct police investigation in such cases.

No such Section 202 procedure exists in police-report cases. The police investigation is already complete; its results are before the Magistrate in the form of the charge-sheet. The Magistrate's scrutiny is limited to the materials already placed before him.

3. Dismissal of Complaint: Section 203

Section 203 CrPC empowers the Magistrate, after considering the statement of the complainant and witnesses and the result of any Section 202 inquiry or investigation, to dismiss the complaint if there is no sufficient ground for proceeding. This provision is exclusive to complaint cases.

The only materials the Magistrate may consider when deciding whether to dismiss under Section 203 are: the statements of the complainant and witnesses under Section 200; and the result of the inquiry or investigation under Section 202 (Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose).

The Magistrate cannot rely on the police case-diary, evidence from a previous complaint, documents filed by the accused, or any other extraneous material.

There is no corresponding provision for dismissal at this stage in a police-report case. The Magistrate acts upon the charge-sheet and either takes cognizance and proceeds, or declines to take cognizance.

4. Effect of Complainant's Non-Appearance: Section 256

In a summons-case instituted upon complaint, if the complainant is absent on any day fixed for hearing, the accused is entitled to be acquitted under Section 256 CrPC, unless the Magistrate dispenses with the complainant's attendance. No similar provision exists in a police-report case.

The State's case does not depend on the private complainant's attendance; the prosecution is conducted by the Public Prosecutor, and the complainant's absence does not affect the proceedings in a police-report case.

Similarly in warrant cases instituted on complaint, the Magistrate has the power to discharge the accused under Section 249 where the complainant is absent — again, exclusively a complaint-case remedy.

5. Compensation for Frivolous Accusation: Section 250

Section 250 CrPC enables the Magistrate, where a case instituted on complaint (or on information given to a police officer) results in discharge or acquittal of the accused, to call upon the complainant to show cause why compensation should not be ordered in favour of the accused. The Magistrate may, if satisfied that there was no reasonable ground for the accusation, order payment of compensation to the accused. This provision — aimed at penalising frivolous accusations — applies to cases instituted both on complaint and on police information, whether tried under the summons or warrant procedure or even summarily.

6. Withdrawal of Complaint: Section 257

In a summons-case instituted on complaint, the complainant may apply to the Magistrate at any time before final orders for permission to withdraw the complaint under Section 257 CrPC. If permission is granted, the accused is acquitted. No equivalent right exists for a private complainant in a police-report case — once the police have filed the charge-sheet, the prosecution is the State's prerogative, and the Public Prosecutor (not the private complainant) controls withdrawal under Section 321.

7. Who May Be a Complainant

Under the new Code, a police officer cannot be a complainant — except where the police report of a non-cognizable case is deemed a complaint by the Explanation to Section 2(d), in which case the police officer who makes the report is deemed the complainant. Barring this, anybody may be a complainant under the Code, subject to statutory exceptions (Vishwa v. Poddar, AIR 1984 SC 5). In police-report cases, the prosecution is initiated by the State through the public prosecutor; there is no private complainant.

Judicial Interpretation: Key Authorities on the Complaint–Police Report Divide

Bhimappa v. Laxman (AIR 1970 SC 1153): The Foundational Ingredients

The Supreme Court in Bhimappa v. Laxman established the foundational four-ingredient analysis of what constitutes a complaint under Section 2(d). The case confirms that the allegation need not be in any particular form, that even an oral allegation suffices, and that the purpose of the complaint must be to move the Magistrate to take criminal action — not merely administrative action.

Abhinandan v. Dinesh (AIR 1968 SC 117): Cognizance Despite Adverse Police Report

This is a foundational authority for the proposition that the two tracks — complaint and police report — are independent channels to the Magistrate. Where the police submit a final report concluding that no case is made out against the accused, the aggrieved complainant may file a complaint before the Magistrate, who may take cognizance on that complaint under Section 190(1)(a) notwithstanding the adverse police report — as the Supreme Court confirmed in Abhinandan v. Dinesh.

The Magistrate may equally take cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) rejecting the conclusions of the police, but basing his cognizance upon the materials collected during investigation. Both options are available, and the character of the proceedings thereafter depends on which of these routes the Magistrate adopts.

H.S. Bains v. State (AIR 1980 SC 1883): Magistrate's Options on Adverse Final Report

The Supreme Court in H.S. Bains v. State (AIR 1980 SC 1883) comprehensively mapped the Magistrate's options on receipt of an adverse police final report:

First, the Magistrate may agree with the police report and find no sufficient ground for proceeding — dropping the proceedings.

Second, he may disagree with the police report and take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b), on the basis of the materials in the charge-sheet, without examining the complainant under Section 200.

Third, he may fall back upon the original complaint filed before him — taking cognizance under Section 190(1)(a) — and then proceed under Section 200 or Section 202.

Fourth, he may, instead of taking cognizance at once, direct an inquiry under Section 202 and thereafter take action under Section 203.

The critical point from H.S. Bains is that the character of the proceedings thereafter is determined by the route the Magistrate chooses: if he takes cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) on the police materials, no Section 200 examination is needed; if he falls back on the complaint, Section 200 becomes mandatory.

Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Shah (AIR 1964 SC 1541): Cognizance Character Determines Subsequent Procedure

The Supreme Court in Jamuna Singh v. Bhadai Shah addressed the question of what determines whether a case is to be treated as "a case instituted upon complaint" or "a case instituted upon police report" — a determination that has far-reaching consequences for the appeal rights of the complainant under Section 378(4) CrPC. The Court held that the character of the cognizance — specifically, whether the Magistrate examined the complainant under Section 200 before directing investigation — is determinative.

If cognizance was taken by examining the complainant under Section 200 before directing police investigation, the case is a complaint case and the police report that follows is part of the Section 202 procedure. If the Magistrate directed police investigation under Section 156(3) without first taking cognizance by examining the complainant, the case is a police-report case.

The Protest Petition as Complaint

A protest petition — filed by the aggrieved complainant challenging a negative final report submitted by the police — is regarded as a complaint. Such a petition, to function as a complaint, must contain the names of witnesses and the other ingredients of a complaint, as confirmed in Qasim v. State ((1984) CrLJ 1677). On receipt of a protest petition fulfilling the requirements of a complaint, the Magistrate should examine the complainant and either issue process under Section 204, order a judicial inquiry under Section 202, or dismiss the petition under Section 203 if sufficient ground is not made out (Mahabir v. State, AIR 1958 Or 11).

BNSS 2023: What Has Changed and What Has Not

Section 2(1)(h) BNSS: Definition Preserved

The Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) carries forward the definition of complaint in Section 2(1)(h) BNSS with only a single verbal change: the word "Code" is replaced with "Sanhita" — as the comparison table confirms. The substance of the definition — allegation oral or written, made to a Magistrate, with a view to action under the Sanhita, that some person has committed an offence, but not including a police report — is identical. The Explanation treating a police officer's report in a non-cognizable case as a complaint is preserved intact.

Section 2(1)(t) BNSS: Police Report Definition Unchanged

Section 2(1)(t) BNSS carries forward the definition of police report from Section 2(r) CrPC without any change — as the comparison table confirms. The definition continues to mean exclusively a report forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under Section 173(2) BNSS (the BNSS equivalent of Section 173(2) CrPC). The exclusion of police reports from the definition of complaint, and the restriction of the police-report route to Section 173(2) final reports only, are preserved in the BNSS.

Section 223 BNSS: New Procedural Safeguard for Cognizance on Complaint Against Public Servant

The most significant departure in the BNSS from the CrPC in the context of complaint-based cognizance is found in Section 223 BNSS (corresponding to Section 200 CrPC). A new first proviso to Section 223(1) BNSS provides that no cognizance of an offence shall be taken by the Magistrate without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard.

Further, a new sub-section (2) of Section 223 BNSS provides that a Magistrate shall not take cognizance on a complaint against a public servant for any offence alleged to have been committed in the course of discharge of official functions or duties unless: (a) the public servant is given an opportunity to make assertions as to the situation that led to the incident alleged; and (b) a report containing facts and circumstances of the incident from the officer superior to such public servant is received by the Magistrate.

These are significant procedural checks on complaint-based cognizance that do not exist under the CrPC. The complaint route — traditionally the most accessible avenue for private parties to access the criminal justice system — now carries an additional layer of procedural formality when the accused is a public servant acting in an official capacity.

Common Misconceptions

Misconception 1: An FIR is a complaint. An FIR under Section 154 CrPC is information given to the police about a cognizable offence. It is not addressed to a Magistrate and therefore cannot be a complaint under Section 2(d). It is the foundation for the police's own investigation, not a route by which the Magistrate takes cognizance.

Misconception 2: A protest petition against a negative final report is filed under Section 190. A protest petition is treated as a complaint under Section 2(d) and the Magistrate must apply the complaint procedure — including Section 200 examination — upon treating it as a complaint. The Magistrate is not bound to accept the negative final report; the protest petition is an independent trigger for cognizance under Section 190(1)(a).

Misconception 3: The Magistrate must always follow Section 200 procedure even in a police-report case. This is incorrect. Where cognizance is taken under Section 190(1)(b) on a police report, the Section 200 procedure does not apply. The Magistrate acts on the materials in the charge-sheet. Section 200 is activated only where cognizance is taken upon a complaint.

Misconception 4: A police officer can file a complaint against an accused. Under the new Code, a police officer cannot be a complainant in the ordinary sense — except where the Explanation to Section 2(d) deems his report to be a complaint in the specific categories discussed above. Barring those cases, a police officer initiates prosecution through the police-report route under Section 173(2), not the complaint route.

Conclusion

Section 2(d) CrPC makes the foundational separation between what is a complaint and what is not, with the exclusion of the police report as its centrepiece. Section 2(r) CrPC then defines the police report with narrow precision — only the Section 173(2) final report — closing the interpretive gaps that plagued the old Code. Together, these two definitions create two discrete procedural universes that a Magistrate must navigate with care.

In the complaint universe, the Magistrate examines the complainant under Section 200, may direct inquiry or investigation under Section 202, may dismiss under Section 203, must accommodate the complainant's right to withdraw under Section 257, and must deal with the consequences of the complainant's non-appearance under Section 256. The Explanation adds nuance: police reports that are the product of unauthorised or non-cognizable investigations are re-characterised as complaints, pulling them back into the complaint universe.

The BNSS 2023 preserves both definitions unchanged while reinforcing the complaint procedure for cases against public servants with a new layer of procedural protection. The foundational division remains — and its mastery remains as essential to criminal practice and examination as it was under the CrPC.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q: What is the definition of complaint under Section 2(d) CrPC and what are its essential ingredients?

Section 2(d) CrPC defines complaint as any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under the Code, that some person has committed an offence. The essential ingredients are: an oral or written allegation in any form; made to a Magistrate (not to police or any other authority); with the purpose of criminal action under the Code; alleging that an offence has been committed. A police report is expressly excluded from this definition.

Q: Why is a police report not a complaint under CrPC?

Section 2(d) CrPC expressly provides that a complaint does not include a police report. A police report is separately defined in Section 2(r) as the final report forwarded by a police officer under Section 173(2) on completion of investigation. The two are distinct: a complaint is made by any person (other than a police officer) to set the Magistrate's judicial machinery in motion; a police report is the end product of police investigation filed by the State's investigating machinery.

Q: When is a police report deemed to be a complaint under the Explanation to Section 2(d)?

The Explanation to Section 2(d) deems a police report to be a complaint in the following situations: where the police investigate a non-cognizable offence without a Magistrate's order under Section 155(2); where investigation into a cognizable offence reveals only a non-cognizable offence; and where a public servant (not authorised to file a charge-sheet under Section 173) submits a report to the Magistrate. In each such case, the police officer is deemed the complainant.

Q: What is the key procedural difference between a complaint case and a police-report case before the Magistrate?

The most immediate difference is Section 200 CrPC: when cognizance is taken on a complaint, the Magistrate must examine the complainant and witnesses on oath. No such examination is required in a police-report case. Further, complaint cases attract Section 202 (Magistrate's inquiry/investigation), Section 203 (dismissal of complaint), Section 256 (acquittal for complainant's non-appearance), and Section 257 (withdrawal of complaint). None of these provisions apply in police-report cases.

Q: What changes has the BNSS 2023 made to the definition of complaint?

Section 2(1)(h) BNSS preserves the definition of complaint from Section 2(d) CrPC with only the substitution of the word "Sanhita" for "Code." The Explanation is unchanged. The most significant change is in Section 223 BNSS (corresponding to Section 200 CrPC): a new proviso requires the Magistrate to give the accused an opportunity of being heard before taking cognizance of any offence on complaint; and a new sub-section (2) requires the Magistrate to give the accused public servant an opportunity to explain, and to receive a superior officer's report, before taking cognizance on a complaint against a public servant alleging acts in discharge of official duty.