Relevancy vs. Admissibility Under the Indian Evidence Act: Why the Two Are Not the Same
- Umang
- 5 hours ago
- 14 min read
Table of Contents
A defence lawyer moves to exclude a prior criminal record placed before the court. A prosecutor insists it goes to the accused's state of mind. The trial judge has to decide, right then, on two questions that sound deceptively similar but belong to entirely different legal categories: is this fact relevant, and is it admissible? Conflating the two is one of the commonest errors both at the Bar and in examination halls.
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ("IEA") draws a sharp, deliberate line between the two concepts. The provisions dealing with the "Relevancy of Facts" are, as the source materials put it, "the hub and fulcrum around which the entire scheme of the Act revolves." Understanding where relevancy ends and admissibility begins — and appreciating the gap between them — is foundational to any serious engagement with the law of evidence.
The Conceptual Framework: How the IEA Structures Evidence Law
The IEA is not a random collection of rules. It is a structured code that determines, with a considerable degree of precision, what the court may legitimately consider when it arrives at its conclusions. Its scheme rests on three building blocks: facts in issue, relevant facts, and evidence. These are not synonyms.
Evidence consists of facts which are declared by the IEA as relevant and which are duly proved in a court of law seized of the suit or proceeding, upon which the court's judgment will be based. Facts which are neither facts in issue nor declared relevant by the Act may not be proved at all. Section 5 of the IEA states this in terms that admit of no equivocation: evidence may be given of every fact in issue and of such other facts as the Act declares to be relevant, and of no others.
What Is a "Fact in Issue"?
A fact in issue is any fact from which, either by itself or in connection with other facts, the existence, non-existence, nature, or extent of any right, liability, or disability asserted or denied in any suit or proceeding necessarily follows. In civil cases, issues are framed by the court from the pleadings of the parties to identify what requires to be decided at trial. In criminal cases, the charge framed by the court constitutes the fact in issue — if the accused is charged with murder, Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 frames the fact in issue.
What Is a "Relevant Fact"?
A fact is relevant to another when the two are connected in any of the ways referred to in the provisions of the IEA relating to relevancy. Relevancy, then, is a statutory connection — not a free-floating logical one. One fact is connected to another not simply because a clever advocate can construct an argument linking them, but because the Act itself recognises that connection as legally significant.
Relevancy: A Statutory Concept, Not a Logical One
Logical Probativeness vs. Legal Relevancy
This distinction is the crux of the entire debate. Logical relevance — or what the source materials call "logical probativeness" — means that a fact has some natural and rational tendency to prove or disprove a fact in issue. Facts which have such a tendency are, in general, admissible, as the Hon'ble Supreme Court noted in RM Malkani v State of Maharashtra AIR 1973 SC 157.
But logical relevance is not the same as legal relevancy under the IEA. No presumption of legal relevancy attaches to facts merely because they are logically relevant. As the source materials state explicitly: "it is for the person tendering evidence of a fact to show that it is relevant under some provision of the Indian Evidence Act."
The person seeking to place a fact before the court must locate the specific provision of the Act under which that fact qualifies as relevant. If no such provision covers it, the fact is excluded — even if it would genuinely assist the court in ascertaining the truth.
This is a more restrictive approach than pure logical relevance, and it is deliberate. The law of evidence is designed to ensure that the court considers only that evidence which enables it to reach a reliable conclusion, as the Supreme Court emphasised in Ramesh Chandra Agrawal v Regency Hospital Ltd AIR 2010 SC 806.
The statutory channel for relevancy serves three purposes: it prevents the waste of the court's time on matters of low probative value, it focuses attention on material facts, and it puts parties on prior notice regarding what they should adduce.
The Closed Categories of Relevant Facts Under the IEA
The IEA carves out a closed list of fact-types that are legally relevant. These include, without being exhaustive:
Facts forming part of the same transaction as the fact in issue (the res gestae principle under Section 6) are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places. The underlying rationale is that when a court deals with a transaction, all facts constituting that transaction must be gone into.
Facts which are the occasion, cause, or effect of facts in issue (Section 7) are relevant. Marks of a struggle near the scene of a murder, or the state of the victim's health before symptoms of poisoning appeared — both fall here.
Facts showing the existence of any state of mind — intention, knowledge, good faith, negligence, ill-will — are relevant when such a state of mind is in issue or relevant under Section 14. The fact relevant as showing a state of mind must show that state of mind not generally, but with reference to the particular matter in question. The prior act of shooting does not prove a present act of shooting, but it does go to establish the shooter's state of mind towards the victim.
Facts showing conduct of any party to a suit in reference to the suit or any fact in issue, whether previous or subsequent to that fact, are relevant under Section 8. The Supreme Court, however, has consistently held that "conduct" in this section does not include statements unless those statements accompany and explain acts other than statements (Bhagwandas Keshwani v State of Rajasthan AIR 1974 SC 898).
Similar facts ordinarily fall outside the closed circle of relevancy. Facts similar to, but not part of, the same transaction as the fact in issue are not generally admissible to prove either the occurrence of the main fact or the identity of its author (Amrita v Emperor ILR 42 Cal 957). The exception, under Section 15, is where the act forms part of a series of similar occurrences — then the similar facts go to intention or knowledge, and to rebut the defence of accident.
Admissibility: The Second Gate
A fact that clears the relevancy hurdle has not yet been admitted into evidence. It must also pass through the second gate: admissibility. This is where the distinction crystallises.
The Haricharan Kurmi Formulation
The locus classicus on this distinction in Indian law is Haricharan Kurmi v State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC 1184. The Supreme Court drew the line with clarity: while the notion of relevancy deals with what is relevant under the IEA, the notion of admissibility deals with "what is expressly barred by the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act."
Relevancy is positive — it asks whether a fact fits within one of the statutory categories. Admissibility is negative — it asks whether anything in the law excludes a fact that would otherwise qualify as relevant. A fact may be relevant and yet inadmissible because the Act, or some other law, specifically bars its proof.
Evidence That Is Relevant Yet Inadmissible
Several categories of otherwise relevant evidence are excluded by the IEA on grounds of public policy, inherent unreliability, or privilege.
Confessions made to police officers (Section 25) are inadmissible regardless of whether they are true, voluntary, or highly relevant to the guilt of the accused. The exclusion is an absolute one rooted in policy — the danger of coerced confessions outweighs their probative value.
Confessions made while in police custody (Section 26) are equally inadmissible, subject to the limited exception carved out by Section 27 for information leading to discovery of facts.
Communications between husband and wife during marriage are privileged and cannot be disclosed in judicial proceedings (Section 122), even though they may be directly relevant to the facts in issue.
Official communications that the court considers injurious to the public interest to disclose (Section 123) remain inadmissible even if they go to the heart of the dispute.
Evidence of character of the accused in criminal cases presents a nuanced illustration of the same principle. The fact that the accused is of good character is relevant (Section 53); the fact that the accused has a bad character is irrelevant — and therefore inadmissible — unless evidence of good character has first been led, or unless the bad character is itself the fact in issue (Section 54). As the Supreme Court observed in Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal v State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 SC 682, past similar acts may go to show bad character and are "irrelevant" under Section 54 in those circumstances.
Opinion evidence is another example. As a matter of general law, witnesses may speak only to facts within their perception, not to opinions or inferences. The exception for expert opinion under Section 45 (and its Indian counterparts) does not open the door to any and all opinion — it is confined to scientific, artistic, foreign law, or other specialised fields where the court lacks the capacity to form its own judgment.
In each of these instances, the fact excluded may be logically probative — it may genuinely tend to establish a fact in issue — but the law has made a deliberate choice to exclude it. The fact remains logically relevant; it becomes legally inadmissible.
Every Admissible Fact Is Not Necessarily Relevant
The reverse proposition is equally important, though less frequently examined in legal scholarship. There exist categories of facts which the court may receive and act upon without going through the relevancy inquiry prescribed by Sections 6 to 55 of the IEA.
Judicial Notice: Admissibility Without Relevancy Inquiry
Section 56 provides that facts judicially noticeable need not be proved. Section 57 enumerates — not exhaustively — the facts of which the court shall take judicial notice: the laws of India, the course of proceedings of Parliament and State Legislatures, the territorial divisions of India, the existence of heads of state and high officials, among others.
These facts are admitted into the court's reasoning not because they have been declared relevant by any provision of the Act, but because the court is presumed to know them as matters of law and official record. Their admissibility is automatic; no party need tender them as evidence, and no relevancy analysis is required. They operate outside the scheme of relevancy altogether.
Admitted Facts and Presumptions
Section 58 provides that facts admitted by the parties need not be proved. An admission of a material fact removes it from the domain of evidence law; it stands established without any enquiry into relevancy or mode of proof.
Similarly, where a conclusive presumption under Section 41 operates — as in the case of orders and judgments in probate jurisdiction — the presumed fact is conclusive and no evidence can be offered to disprove it (Calcutta Municipal Corporation v Pawan Kumar Saraf AIR 1999 SC 738). Again, the court receives the fact as established without traversing the relevancy provisions.
The court's power to raise presumptions under Section 114 — that the common course of natural events has been followed, that a letter duly posted has been delivered, that a man in possession of recently stolen goods is either the thief or a receiver — also produces findings on facts that have not been put through the conventional relevancy filter.
The Role of the Judge: Exclusive Arbiter of Both Thresholds
The IEA casts the exclusive responsibility of deciding both relevancy and admissibility on the presiding judge. The judge shall admit the evidence if he thinks that the fact, if proved, would be relevant, and not otherwise. No fact may be proved unless it is either a fact in issue or a fact declared relevant (Abinash Chandra Chatterjee v Paresh Nath Ghose 9 CWN 402).
At the same time, the IEA confers enormous reserve power on the trial court to put any question, relevant or irrelevant, to any witness, in any form, or to order production of any document (Hanuman Ram v Rajasthan (2008) 15 SCC 652). But this wide inquisitorial power is balanced by the mandate that the judgment must be based exclusively upon facts declared relevant by the Act and duly proved. The court may probe freely; it must decide strictly.
Improper admission or rejection of evidence does not, by itself, mandate a new trial. Where the wrongly admitted evidence, if excluded, would not have changed the outcome — or where wrongly rejected evidence, if admitted, would not have varied the decision — the impropriety does not vitiate the judgment.
This position, confirmed by the Supreme Court in Chandrappa v Karnataka 2007 (4) SCC 415, reflects a pragmatic approach: the law will not undo an otherwise sound verdict merely on an evidentiary technicality. But the reception of inadmissible evidence is considered less injurious than the rejection of admissible evidence, because in the former case the wrongly admitted evidence can simply be excluded from consideration on appeal.
Evidence Wrongfully Obtained: Where the Two Concepts Converge
An important corollary to the relevancy-admissibility distinction arises in the context of illegally or improperly obtained evidence. The position under the IEA is clear: where the Act treats a fact as relevant, and neither the Act nor any other law bars its admissibility on any ground, the courts have no discretion to refuse to admit that evidence. The illegality of the means by which it was obtained does not make an otherwise relevant and admissible fact irrelevant or inadmissible.
This principle, drawn from the English rule that "admissible evidence is evidence by whatever means it is obtained" (Kuruma v Reginam (1955) 1 All ER 23), places India in a markedly different position from jurisdictions like the United States, where the exclusionary rule may operate to suppress evidence obtained in violation of constitutional guarantees.
Under the IEA framework, if a document is seized illegally but its contents are relevant under Section 7 or Section 8, the court will admit it. The remedy for the illegal seizure lies elsewhere — in public law or in criminal proceedings against the officer — not in the exclusion of the evidence.
Position Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023
The Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 ("BSA"), which has replaced the IEA, has broadly retained the structure and substance of the relevancy provisions. The provisions corresponding to the IEA's relevancy scheme (Sections 5–16) are replicated in Sections 3–14 of the BSA with minimal substantive change.
Section 3 BSA (corresponding to Section 5 IEA) retains the foundational rule: evidence may be given of facts in issue and relevant facts, and of no others. The distinction between relevancy and admissibility is thus carried forward intact into the new law.
Section 4 BSA (Section 6 IEA) preserves the res gestae principle without change.
Section 5 BSA (Section 7 IEA) retains facts constituting occasion, cause, or effect of facts in issue, with the minor addition of the words "or relevant facts" in the heading.
Section 6 BSA (Section 8 IEA) on motive, preparation, and conduct replaces the word "vakils" with "advocates" and "ravished" with "raped," reflecting contemporary language — but the substantive law is unchanged.
Section 12 BSA (Section 14 IEA) on facts showing state of mind or bodily feeling updates the illustrations: "coin" becomes "currency" and "carriage" becomes "cars." Again, the operative law is untouched.
The admissibility exclusions are equally preserved. Confessions to police officers (Section 23 BSA, corresponding to Section 25 IEA) remain inadmissible, with the BSA reorganising related provisions as sub-sections and provisos for structural clarity. Privilege rules and character evidence provisions are carried forward without substantive amendment.
One notable expansion in the BSA touches the expert opinion provisions.
Section 39 BSA (corresponding to Section 45 IEA) adds the words "or any other field" to the list of subjects on which expert opinion is admissible — a significant broadening that opens the door to expert evidence in domains not specifically enumerated in the old Act.
Practitioners and law students ought to bear in mind that while the IEA is the law on which the substantial body of case law has been built, the BSA now governs proceedings. References to section numbers should be updated accordingly, though the precedents decided under the IEA continue to hold persuasive value wherever the corresponding BSA provision is unamended in substance.
Practical Implications for Advocates and Students
At the trial stage, the relevancy-admissibility distinction has immediate procedural consequences. An objection that a piece of evidence is irrelevant challenges whether it fits any of the statutory categories under Sections 3–55 of the IEA (or Sections 2–50 of the BSA).
An objection that it is inadmissible invokes an exclusionary rule — whether a privilege, a statutory bar, or a constitutional prohibition. These are not interchangeable objections; they require different arguments, attract different legal responses, and, if sustained, produce different outcomes.
An objection going to the mode of proof — as distinct from the fact itself — must be raised at the stage of admission. Where the objection is that the mode of proof is irregular or insufficient, it must be taken before the document is marked as an exhibit. Failure to object at that stage effectively waives the objection, and it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
The probative value of evidence — its weight once admitted — is a distinct third inquiry that follows both relevancy and admissibility. Evidence may be relevant, admissible, and yet carry very little weight.
Motive, for instance, is a relevant fact, but the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the discovery of the true motive behind a crime is not imperative in every case (Yeshwant and Brahmanand v State of Maharashtra AIR 1973 SC 337). Where direct evidence is available, proof of motive recedes into the background. Probative force is evaluated after admission; it is not a condition precedent to it.
Conclusion
The Indian Evidence Act — and now the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — proceeds on the premise that truth-finding in adversarial litigation cannot be conducted without rules. Left ungoverned, a trial would become a forum for any assertion, however tangential, unreliable, or prejudicial. The twin filters of relevancy and admissibility are the law's answer to that problem.
Relevancy is a statutory category: a fact is relevant only if the Act says it is, regardless of how logically compelling its connection to the facts in issue might be. Admissibility is an exclusionary concept: a fact that has qualified as relevant may still be barred from proof if the Act or some other law expressly prevents it. And beyond both these categories sit facts that the court receives without any relevancy inquiry — judicially noticed facts, admitted facts, and facts established through conclusive presumptions.
The practitioner who conflates the two concepts is likely to press the wrong objection at trial and argue the wrong ground on appeal. The student who treats them as synonyms will find the distinction precisely where examination papers are designed to expose it. Mastering this divide is not mere academic exercise; it is the foundation on which sound evidentiary practice is built.
Frequently Asked Questions
Q: What is the key difference between relevancy and admissibility under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872?
Relevancy is a statutory concept: a fact is legally relevant only if it falls within one of the categories declared relevant by the provisions of the IEA (Sections 5–55). Admissibility, on the other hand, concerns whether the law excludes an otherwise relevant fact — on grounds of public policy, privilege, or inherent unreliability. A fact must first be relevant and then pass the admissibility test; but the two questions are asked separately and governed by different legal rules.
Q: Can a fact be relevant under the IEA but still be inadmissible?
Yes. Confessions made to police officers are directly relevant to the guilt of the accused — they may be completely true and highly probative. Yet Section 25 of the IEA (Section 23 of the BSA) renders them inadmissible on grounds of public policy.
Similarly, privileged communications between spouses, official communications whose disclosure would injure the public interest, and opinion evidence from non-experts are all cases where relevant material is excluded by specific statutory bars.
Q: Can a fact be admissible before a court without passing through the relevancy provisions of the IEA?
Yes. Facts of which the court takes judicial notice under Sections 56 and 57 of the IEA (Sections 51 and 52 of the BSA) are admitted into the court's reasoning without any inquiry into relevancy. Similarly, facts admitted by the parties under Section 58, and facts established through conclusive presumptions under Section 41, operate outside the conventional relevancy framework.
Q: How has the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 changed the law on relevancy and admissibility?
The BSA has substantially preserved the relevancy architecture of the IEA. Sections 3–14 of the BSA correspond to Sections 5–16 of the IEA with minimal substantive amendment — chiefly updating language (replacing "vakils" with "advocates," "ravished" with "raped," and "coin" with "currency" in illustrations). The admissibility exclusions, including the bar on confessions to police officers and privilege rules, are equally retained. The most significant change is the expansion of expert opinion under Section 39 BSA to cover "any other field" beyond the specifically enumerated categories in Section 45 IEA.
Q: What happens when a court improperly admits or rejects evidence at trial?
Improper admission or rejection does not, by itself, warrant reversal of the decision. If the wrongly admitted evidence, when excluded, would not have changed the outcome — or if the wrongly rejected evidence, had it been admitted, would not have varied the decision — the impropriety is not fatal to the judgment.
The Supreme Court has confirmed this position in Chandrappa v Karnataka 2007 (4) SCC 415. However, where the only evidence to support a finding is inadmissible, or where the rejection of admissible evidence results in a finding of fact that has no evidentiary basis, the appellate court is duty-bound to interfere.
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